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Economists have strong theoretical predictions about how in-kind transfer programs -- such as providing
vouchers for food -- impact consumption.  Despite the prominence of the theory, there has been little
empirical work documenting actual responses to in-kind transfers.  In this work, we leverage previously
underutilized variation in the date of the county-level original implementation of the Food Stamp Program
in the 1960s and early 1970s.  Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, we employ difference-in-difference
methods to estimate the impact of program availability on food spending, labor supply and family
income. Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find that the introduction of food stamps leads
to a decrease in out of pocket food spending, an increase in overall food expenditures, and a decrease
(although insignificant) in the propensity to take meals out. The results are quite precisely estimated
for total food spending, with less precision in estimating the impacts on out of pocket food costs. We
find evidence of small work disincentive impacts in the PSID, which is confirmed with an analysis
of the 1960, 1970 and 1980 Census.
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  Providing assistance to the poor through in-kind transfers such as vouchers for food and 
housing garners more political support than providing assistance in cash.  Supporters of such policies 
believe that providing voucher payments for certain goods (like groceries) will cause recipients to 
purchase more of the goods being subsidized, and that recipients will not be able to use public 
assistance to buy other, less socially desirable goods (like alcohol or cigarettes).  According to 
canonical economic theory, though, providing a transfer in-kind should lead to the same outcome as a 
similar sized cash transfer as long as program participants are inframarginal.  As a result, depending 
on consumer preferences the provision of in-kind transfers (relative to cash) may have little to no 
impact on purchases of the actual goods being subsidized. 
Despite strong theoretical predictions about consumer behavior, little empirical evidence has 
been brought to bear on the impacts of providing in-kind transfers on consumer purchases.
1 The Food 
Stamp Program (FSP) is one of the largest transfer programs for the low income population.  In 2004, 
for example, the program cost $27 billion and served 24 million persons.  This compares to 
$25 billion for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families and $33 billion for the Earned Income Tax 
Credit. It has been very difficult for researchers to isolate the causal impact of the FSP on food 
spending, nutritional intake, labor supply and other outcomes.  Because the program is national, there 
is not variation in program parameters (such as stark differences in state benefit levels or eligibility) 
that are typically exploited by researchers to measure program impacts.  In the absence of 
programmatic variation, most researchers have studied the impact of the FSP by comparing food 
stamp recipients with eligible non-recipients.  Since we would expect participants and non-
participants to differ in important – and potentially unobservable – ways (Currie 2006) researchers 
                                                 
1 There is a literature that explores the impact of cash transfer programs (Engen and Gruber 2001; Gruber 1997, 
2000; Hubbard et al 1995; and Kantor and Fishback 1996) and in-kind transfer programs (Gruber and Yelowitz 
1999) on consumption and wealth. This literature is particularly concerned with the insurance element in public 
programs and in estimating the impact on precautionary savings and consumption smoothing. More recently, Meyer 
and Sullivan (2004) examine the impact of welfare and tax reform on consumption, making the argument that 
consumption is an important measure of family well-being that has been largely ignored in the evaluation of transfer 
programs (Meyer and Sullivan 2003). 2 
have employed a variety of methods to control for selection into the program (see Fraker, 1990, for a 
comprehensive review the literature on food stamps and consumption). 
In general, the literature has concluded that food stamps increase food purchase among 
program participants by a much larger amount than would be predicted by the canonical economic 
model.  These studies have found that the marginal propensity to consume food out of food stamp 
income is about 4 times higher than it is out of cash income (Fraker 1990).  As a result, food stamp 
benefits worth $100 are thought to cause about a $17-$47 increase in food spending while a cash 
transfer of $100 is associated with closer to a $5-$10 increase in food spending.  But, as mentioned 
above, these results have been based on studies that rely on strong and untested assumptions.  In 
addition, they are focused on the impact of the type of income, and only indirectly address the more 
basic policy question regarding the impact on food spending and other important outcomes of a 
sizeable, targeted transfer to the poor. 
  To measure the impact of the food stamp program in this project, we utilize an 
underexploited source of variation: the original introduction of the program across counties.
2  There 
is tremendous variation in the timing of FSP introduction across counties in the United States—the 
earliest county programs were established in 1961 and the last county programs were established in 
1975.  The FSP started as eight county-level pilot programs and later expanded to 43 counties.  This 
led to passage of the Food Stamp Act of 1964 which gave local areas the authority to start up FSPs in 
their county.  This led to a steady increase in FSP adoption over the next ten years. Finally, the 1973 
Amendments to the Food Stamp Act mandated that all counties offer FSP by 1975.   
  Our approach has the appeal of relying on non-marginal changes in incentives faced by 
consumers.  This “program introduction” research design has been taken in recent analyses of other 
social programs such as Head Start (Ludwig and Miller 2007), Medicare (Finkelstein and McKnight 
2005), and Title I (Cascio et al., 2006).  It is also part of a larger literature examining impacts of the 
                                                 
2 Currie and Moretti (2006) use food stamp program introduction across California counties to examine the impact 
of the program on birth outcomes.  3 
Great Society and Civil Rights era (for example see Almond, Chay and Greenstone 2006). 
  We use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to address two important 
research questions. First, we use the PSID from 1968-1978 to examine the impact of the FSP on food 
consumption.  Specifically, we look at expenditures on food spent at home, meals out, food stamp 
savings, and total food spending.  Second, we examine the FSP as a traditional income support 
program—a guaranteed benefit combined with a program phase-out or benefit reduction rate. This 
structure is well known to cause a disincentive to work (Moffitt 1983). While the benefit reduction 
rate in food stamps is quite low compared to cash welfare programs, standard labor supply models 
would predict that food stamps would reduce employment and hours worked.  Here, we are able to 
augment our main estimates from the PSID with estimates based on the 1960, 1970 and 1980 
decennial censuses. 
  We employ a basic difference-in-difference model where the treatment is at the county level, 
with controls for county and year fixed effects and state linear time trends.  In this model, 
identification requires that there are no contemporaneous county level trends that are correlated with 
food stamp introduction and family economic outcomes. We control for possible confounders in two 
ways.  
  First, we examine the determinants of the food stamp program start dates across counties. We 
are guided by the historical descriptions of the political landscape around the FSP. Using county 
characteristics from the pre-treatment period, we find that earlier food stamp program introduction 
occurs in counties that are more populous, urban, black, low income, and with a smaller fraction of 
land used in agriculture. While these county characteristics are statistically significant determinants 
of county FSP implementation, we find that they explain little of the overall variation in food stamp 
implementation. However, ignoring these underlying determinants of county implementation could 
lead to spurious findings if counties that implement food stamps earlier are on a different trend than 
counties that implement later. Following Acemoglu, Autor and Lyle (2004), we use these results to 4 
motivate the inclusion of trends interacted with county pre-treatment characteristics in our regression 
models.   
  Second, food stamp introduction took place during a period of great expansion in programs 
for the poor in the United States. To control for the possible coincident expansion of other programs 
such as AFDC, Medicaid, Medicare, and social security, we include three measures of annual per 
capita county transfer payments (cash public assistance, medical care, and retirement and disability 
programs) obtained from Bureau of Economics Analysis Regional Economic Information System 
(U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 2007).  
  Overall, our results indicate that people behave as the theory predicts.  We find that the 
introduction of food stamps leads to a decrease in out of pocket food spending, an increase in overall 
food expenditures, and a decrease in the propensity to eat meals out at restaurants.  The results are 
quite precisely estimated for total food spending, with less precision in estimating the impacts on out 
of pocket food costs and meals out.  Further, we find evidence that the marginal propensity to 
consume food out of food stamp income is close to the marginal propensity to consume out of cash 
income.  The point estimates consistently point to small negative work disincentive effects, although 
few parameters are statistically significant. This is confirmed with an analysis of the 1960, 1970 and 
1980 Census. The results are robust to many sensitivity tests including adding more fixed effects, 
examining subgroups of the sample, and placebo tests on groups not likely to use food stamps.  
  The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II presents a history of the food 
stamp program.  Section III discusses the expected effects of the program and Section IV reviews the 
existing literature. Section V describes the data and Section VI presents the methodology. Sections 
VII and VIII present our results and Section IX concludes.  
II. Introduction of Food Stamp Program 
  The origins of the modern Food Stamp Program began in 1961 with President Kennedy’s 5 
first executive order establishing eight county-level pilot programs.
3  The pilot programs were later 
expanded to 43 counties in 1962 and 1963.  The success with these pilot programs led to the Food 
Stamp Act of 1964 (FSA). The FSA gave local areas the authority to start up Food Stamp Programs 
(FSP) in their county. As with the current FSP, the program was federally funded and benefit levels 
did not vary across areas. In the period following the passage of the FSA, there was a steady stream 
of counties initiating food stamp programs. Support for requiring food stamp programs grew due to a 
national spotlight on hunger (Berry 1984). This interest culminated in passage of 1973 Amendments 
to the Food Stamp Act, which mandated that all counties offer FSP by 1975. 
  At the time the FSP was introduced and expanded, hunger and nutritional deficiencies were 
not uncommon among Americans. For example, a survey of low income families in Texas, 
Louisiana, Kentucky, and West Virginia in 1968-1970 found that 15 percent of whites and 37 percent 
of blacks had low hemoglobin levels (Eisinger 1998). There were also relatively high rates of 
deficiencies in vitamin C, riboflavin and protein. In fact, a CBS documentary entitled “Hunger in 
America” which aired in 1968 raised national awareness of the problem and possibly influenced the 
policy debate on the FSP (Berry 1984). 
  It is important to understand the political context in which the FSP was introduced in the U.S. 
Prior to the modern day FSP, some counties provided food aid through the commodity distribution 
program (CDP).
4  The main goal of the CDP was to support farm prices and farm income by 
removing surplus commodities from the market.  It was seen, however, as inadequate to promote the 
nutritional well-being of low income persons and the Citizens’ Board of Inquiry into Hunger and 
Malnutrition in the United States declared that “the commodity distribution program is a failure” in 
its 1968 report Hunger, U.S.A. (Citizen’s Board of Inquiry 1968). Of the 1,000 poorest counties, one-
third offered no food assistance of any kind in 1967.  Furthermore, of counties that did offer the 
program, the commodities rarely reached a majority of the poor population because of obstacles such 
                                                 
3 This section is based on Berry (1984) and MacDonald (1977). 
4 In 1967 – the only year that comprehensive county-level data is available – 44 percent of the population lived in 
counties that offered the CDP. 6 
as distribution centers that were difficult to reach, the limited range of products and infrequent timing 
of the distribution of goods.
5  Consequently, debate about moving from the CDP to the FSP pitted 
powerful agricultural interests against advocates for the poor (MacDonald 1977, Berry 1984).  In 
fact, as described in Berry (1984), passage of the 1964 Food Stamp Act was achieved through classic 
legislative logrolling. The farm interest coalition (Southern Democrats, Republicans) wanted to pass 
an important cotton-wheat subsidy bill while advocates for the poor (Northern Democrats) wanted to 
pass the FSA.  Neither had majorities, yet they combined forces, supported each others bills, and 
both bills passed.   
  This political history is important because it illustrates that there was significant 
heterogeneity across the country in support for the FSP.  Remember that the 1964 Act allowed for 
counties to voluntarily set up food stamp programs. The above discussion suggests that counties with 
strong support for farming interests may adopt FSP later in the period while those with strong 
support for the low income population may adopt FSP earlier in the period.  Consequently, the food 
stamp program introduction may not be completely exogenous. We return to this below.  
  Figure 1 summarizes the overall pattern of FSP introduction. In particular, the figure plots the 
percent of counties offering FSP, where the counties are weighted by their 1970 population.  Note 
this is not the food stamp caseload, but represents the percent of the national population that lived in 
an area offering a FSP. The figure shows that there was a long ramp up period between 1964 and 
1975, leading to the eventual universal coverage of the FSP.  For example in 1968 about half of the 
population lived in counties with FSP and by 1972 this rose to over 80 percent.  It is this ramp up 
period that forms the basis of our research design.
6 
  It is important to understand the CDP program in order to interpret the magnitude of the FSP 
effects. For example, if all food stamp recipients simply moved over from receiving an equal amount 
                                                 
5 The boxes were also difficult to transport: the monthly box of food for a family of 4 weighed almost 95 pounds 
(Hunger U.S.A.). 
6 County FSP implementation dates are reported in USDA annual reports on county food stamp caseloads (U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, various years). 7 
of commodities, we would not expect to find any impact of the FSP on consumption.  On the other 
hand, if counties adopting the FSP did not previously have access to the CDP or if the FSP provided 
a “larger” or “better” set of consumption choices, then the estimated coefficients would pick up the 
effect of the introduction of the program. 
  The evidence shows that the FSP indeed represents an important “treatment” over and above 
the CDP. First, as shown in Figure 2, the FSP caseload quickly overtakes the CDP caseload. In fact, 
the CDP was far from universally available prior to the FSP. For example, in 1967 35 percent of 
counties (not population-weighted) offered neither FSP nor CDP, 38 percent of counties offered only 
a CDP, 21 percent offered only a FSP, and 6 percent of counties offered both a CDP and FSP.
7  
Second, the CDP provided a very narrow set of commodities—the most frequently available 
commodities were flour, cornmeal, rice, dried milk, peanut butter and rolled wheat (Citizens’ Board 
of Inquiry, 1968). In contrast, the food stamp benefits can be used to purchase all food items (except 
hot foods for immediate consumption, formula and vitamins). Further, the commodities were 
distributed infrequently. Finally, analyses of food intake in counties converting from CDP to FSP 
found that in its allowing participants to purchase a wide variety of food including fresh meat and 
vegetables, the FSP represented an important increase in the quality and quantity of food in 
comparison to the CDP (U.S. Congressional Budget Office 1977, Currie and Moretti 2006). 
To get more insight into the geographic variation in the ramp-up to a universal FSP, Figure 3 
shows the timing of food stamp introduction by county.  In the figure, the shading of the counties is 
assigned by county FSP start up date—with darker shading denoting an earlier start up date.  This 
shows a great deal of variation in FSP introduction within and across states.  Our basic identification 
strategy uses this county level variation in food stamp “treatment.”       
To further explore the degree of within state variation in FSP start dates, Figure 4 presents 
FSP coverage rates by state for 1961-1975.  This figure, as in Figure 1, plots the percent of the 
                                                 
7 Theoretically, counties were not supposed to have both FSP and CDP in place at the same time, but in practice 
some places did offer both. We have not been able to find a consistent time series for county participation in the 
CDP. Consequently, we are unable to use this information in our empirical analysis.  8 
population (in this case in the state) that lives in a county offering food stamps. In some states, such 
as Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Massachusetts, and Florida, there was little or no within state variation in 
food stamp start dates.  Other states such as California, New Mexico, and Minnesota have much 
greater within state variation in the food stamp start dates. The figure shows that in most states, the 
county level food stamp introduction took place in a narrower period than for the country as a whole. 
  As discussed above, the 1964 FSA allowed counties to start FSP—but it was voluntary. 
Therefore, for our research design to be valid, we need for the assignment of county start up of FSP 
to be exogenous.  The discussion above suggests that northern, urban counties with large poor 
populations were more likely to adopt food stamp programs earlier while southern, rural counties 
with strong agricultural interests adopted food stamps later. This systematic variation in food stamp 
adoption could lead to spurious estimates of the program impact if those same county characteristics 
are associated with differential trends in the outcome variables. 
  To explore this we compiled characteristics of counties in 1960, on the eve of the first food 
stamp pilot programs. We use these “pre” characteristics to predict the date that the county adopted a 
food stamp program. The data on county characteristics come from the 1960 City and County Data 
Book, which is based on data from the 1960 Census of Population and 1960 Census of Agriculture. 
The dependent variable is the month and year of the county’s food stamp start date—expressed as an 
index equal to 1 in January 1961, 2 in February 1961, and so on. In some specifications, we omit 
from the analysis the initial pilot counties as they were chosen by a different process than the later 
counties.  In those cases, the dependent variable therefore ranges from 25 (January 1963) to 175 (July 
1975). The independent variables include the percent of the 1960 population that lives in an urban 
area, is black, is less than 5, is 65 or over, has income less than $3,000 (1959$), the percent of land in 
the county that is farmland, and log of the county population. We include the population to capture 
the fact that large counties might find the application process less costly relative to the benefits of 9 
application. Descriptive statistics for this data are provided in Appendix Table 1.
8 
  The results are presented in Table 1.  We present estimates with (columns 2-4) and without 
(column 1) state fixed effects. All regressions are weighted by the 1960 county population.  Focusing 
on the results with state fixed effects, we find that counties that are more populous, urban, black, and 
low income implement the FSP earlier. Further, those with a larger share of the population that is 
very young or old implement earlier and counties where more of the land is used in farming 
implement later. The impacts of county characteristics are smaller (in absolute value) in counties the 
South (column 4). 
  While these regression results show statistically significant impacts of the county 
characteristics on the timing of food stamp implementation, the quantitative importance of these 
predictors is small and most of the variation remains unexplained. To illustrate this, Figure 5 
provides scatter plots of each of six county characteristics (x-axis) against the county FSP 
implementation date (y-axis). For guidance, we also provided the univariate linear regression line 
(weighted by the county population) for each panel. These figures show that the magnitude of the 
association between the county characteristics and the food stamp start date is weak and there is an 
enormous amount of variation that is not explained by the characteristics.  This is consistent with the 
characterization of funding limits controlling the movement of counties off the waiting list to start up 
their FSP: “The program was quite in demand, as congressmen wanted to reap the good will and 
publicity that accompanied the opening of a new project. At this time there was always a long 
waiting list of counties that wanted to join the program. Only funding controlled the growth of the 
program as it expanded” (Berry 1984, p. 36-37). 
  We view the weakness of the fit of the model as a strength when it comes to our 
identification approach—in that much of the variation in the implementation of FSP appears to be 
                                                 
8 Further, in this analysis—and in the subsequent analyses of the PSID and Census—we drop observations from 
Alaska due to inconsistencies in county definitions across samples and over time. Here we also drop very small 
counties (with population less than 1,000) because of missing data and a few counties where the percent of land used 
in farming was greater than 100 percent. 10 
idiosyncratic. Nonetheless, in order to control for possible differences in trends across counties that is 
spuriously correlated with the county treatment effect, we follow Acemoglu et al. (2004) and all of 
our regressions include interactions of these 1960 pre-treatment county characteristics with time 
trends.
9 
  This period of FSP introduction took place as part of the much larger federal “war on 
poverty.” For example, this period included the introduction of Medicaid, Medicare, Head Start and 
the Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children (WIC). Further, AFDC, social 
security and disability income programs expanded. If these programs are mainly varying at the state 
level then our controls for state linear time trends or state-year fixed effects should absorb these 
program impacts.  However, to control for the possible coincident expansion of other programs, we 
also include annual measures of county per capita transfer payments for cash income support, 
medical care, and retirement and disability programs.
10  
III. Expected Effects of Food Stamp Introduction 
  The current Food Stamp program provides a benefit to eligible families which is the 
difference between the cost of a family-size adjusted “thrifty food plan” (e.g. the guarantee in 
transfer program parlance) and the amount a family can afford to spend on food.  In this scenario, as 
understood in the canonical Southworth (1945) model and illustrated in Figure 6, the original budget 
line reflects the tradeoff between food and all other goods, and is shifted out horizontally by the 
amount of food stamps received (labeled here as BF).  The basic prediction of this transfer is that 
overall spending on food and other goods will increase as shown by the illustrated optimal points C0* 
and C1* in the Figure 6(b). Out of pocket food expenses are expected to decrease (here the decrease 
is F2−F0 ). Consequently, the increase in food consumption, shown here as F1−F0, is less than the 
increase in food stamps BF.  It is possible, that a household that has a high demand for non-food 
                                                 
9Another approach might be to use these estimates to form propensity scores for matching counties.  However, the 
weak fit of the model renders this less appealing.  
10 We have no documentation that any of these programs had the county roll out feature that provides the basis for 
our identification of the FSP. With respect to other nutrition programs, the National School Lunch Program had long 
been established, having started in 1946, and WIC was implemented more universally in 1972. 11 
relative to food might, as shown in Figure 6(c), might be constrained by the in kind nature of food 
stamps (relative to a cash transfer) and would locate at the kink. For these families, food stamps 
would lead to a larger increase in food consumption than an equivalent transfer in cash.
11 
  Prior to 1979 (and during the time period studied here), families had to make a cash up front 
payment to receive the food stamp benefits. This feature, called the “purchase requirement” did not 
change the magnitude of the benefits a family received.
12  Figure 7 shows the budget constraint in 
this case, where the amount of the purchase requirement is P. Note that the sloped part of the budget 
constraint is still shifted outward by the food stamp benefit (again BF) but the top is censored and the 
attainable budget set is smaller. That is, a participant can no longer choose any consumption bundles 
that would have them spending more than their total income (Y) minus P.
13  This means that there 
will likely be more people consuming at the kink in the budget constraint under the purchase 
requirement program than under the current program. This suggests that in our analysis (when the 
purchase requirement was in place), the impact of food stamps on food spending will be somewhat 
larger than it would be under current (no purchase requirement) program or under a cash transfer 
scheme.
14 
The focus of the paper is testing these predictions for consumption. The PSID provides 
several measures of food expenditures—cash outlays for food at home, food bought with food stamps 
and food away from home—that in theory respond in different manners to the food stamp program.
15 
Clearly food bought with food stamps should increase after the introduction of the program and cash 
                                                 
11 Implicit in Figure 6 is the assumption that relative prices of food to nonfood are unchanged with the FSP. While it 
seems possible that the FSP could have led to increases in food prices (through increases in demand among the low 
income population) we have no data to test this hypothesis. As is typical in household survey data, in the PSID we 
measure expenditures not consumption.  
12 That is, if the family was deemed able to afford to spend $100 on food, but the cost of the thrifty food plan was 
$300, the family could purchase $300 in food stamps for the cash price of $100.  Today, a similar family would 
receive simply receive $200 in food stamps and would not have to outlay any cash. 
13 Of course, a potential recipient would choose not to participate in the program if they would prefer to consume 
such a bundle to the consumption bundle at the kinked part of the budget constraint. 
14 Beginning in 1971, participants could purchase their food stamp benefits in increments of 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 1.00 of 
their full food stamp allotment (MacDonald 1977). They could make these purchases every 2 weeks. This “variable 
purchase option,” as shown in Figure 7(c) will reduce the number of families at the kink. 
15 Food bought with food stamps is the value of food bought less the price paid for the stamps. So it is the “benefit” 
or “bonus value” from participating in food stamps. 12 
outlays for food at home should decrease. The prediction for spending on meals away from home is 
ambiguous given the positive income effect (due to the income transfer) and negative substitution 
effect (due to the reduction in the price of food at home). Given this low income population and high 
subsidy to food at home, we expect that the FSP will lead to a decrease in meals out. Finally, we 
expect an increase in total food consumed from all sources—deriving from higher total cash plus 
food stamp income under food stamps and the distortion of consumption toward food for those 
consuming at or near the kink point. Unfortunately, the PSID does not provide the data necessary to 
test the prediction that FSP leads to an increase in nonfood expenditures.
16  
We also estimate the impact of the FSP on labor supply and family cash income. Like other 
means-tested programs, the FSP alters the household’s labor-leisure tradeoff increasing total income 
conditional on hours worked.  In particular, the food stamp benefit is largest at zero hours of work, 
and benefits are reduced for each additional dollar earned (although at 30 percent the tax rate is much 
lower than typical tax rates under welfare programs).  The combination of the income effect of the 
benefit as well as the substitution effect from the benefit reduction rate leads, unambiguously, to a 
predicted decline in employment, hours worked, and (if wages are fixed) earnings.  In addition, 
family cash income (which as measured does not include food stamp benefits) would also be 
predicted to fall.  We explore the possible work disincentives in the PSID by examining impacts on 
head’s employment, annual hours, earnings, and family income.
17 
IV. Literature Review 
  A large literature, mostly using data from more than 20 years ago, focuses on whether the 
FSP leads to larger increases in food spending than a similar sized cash transfer. However, the 
                                                 
16 Depending on the year, the PSID sometimes includes expenditures on rent, utilities, tobacco and alcohol. 
Unfortunately, there are not enough years of data to implement our research design. 
17 Given the outward shift in the budget set and the expected increase in food consumption, we would also expect 
that the introduction of the FSP would lead to improvements in health. In an earlier version of the paper, we 
examined impacts on health outcome using the PSID variable on head’s missed work due to illness. We concluded 
that this measure is too crude to capture any impacts as those models were very imprecisely estimated. Almond et al. 
(2006) estimate the impacts of the FSP on birth outcomes and infant mortality for the US as a whole and Currie and 
Moretti 2006 use natality data from California to examine impacts on birth outcomes. 13 
available variation that can be used to identify the impact is limited. Most of the observational studies 
in the literature (described in Fraker, 1990, and Levedahl, 1995) estimate the marginal propensity to 
consume food using the following linear specification: 
(1)   01 2 ii i i i fspend cash fstamp Z β ββ γ ε =+ + + +  
where  i fspend  is expenditure on food for household i,  i cash  and  i fstamp  are income in cash and 
from food stamps, respectively,  i Z  is a vector of covariates such as household size and age/gender 
makeup, and  i ε  is a normal disturbance term. Variants on this standard specification include the 
“semi-log specification” which replaces cash with ln(cash) (food stamps, though, are typically still 
estimated in levels) or a “double-log specification” in which ln(fspend) is the dependent variable. 
Here the primary impact of the food stamp program is measured as the increased consumption out of 
food stamps compared to cash income, as measured by the differences in estimated coefficients by 
income type in equation (1). 
Fraker (1990), in a summary of the literature, reports that most of the food stamp literature 
finds that the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) food out of food stamps is 2-10 times higher 
than out of cash income and can easily reject the null hypothesis that  21 β β = , even when the 
samples are restricted to only food stamp recipients who spend more on food than their food stamps 
are worth.  The median study in Fraker’s literature review reports a marginal propensity to consume 
food out of food stamp income that is 3.8 times as large as that from cash income.
18  These findings 
are often interpreted as evidence that food stamps increase food spending by more than an equivalent 
cash-transfer system would.   
The literature suffers from many of the standard shortcomings of observational studies.  For 
example, most of the estimates were identified from differences between food stamp recipients and 
equally low-income families that were eligible for food stamps but for some unobservable reasons 
                                                 
18 The MPC out of cash is estimated to be 0.03-0.17 (with most estimates between 0.05 and 0.10), and the MPC out 
of food stamps is estimated to be 0.17-0.47. 14 
chose not to enroll in the program (such as a preference to consume non-food goods).  In this case, a 
comparison between participants and non-participants may overstate the impact of the program.  
Other studies compare food stamp recipients to higher-income families who are not eligible for food 
stamps.  These studies rely strongly on the functional form imposed on income, which may fail to 
adequately account for the Engel curve which predicts that spending on food accounts for a larger 
share of total spending at very low levels of income.  If the nonlinearities in food spending implied 
by the Engel curve coincide with income from food stamps, then the estimated coefficient on food 
stamp income could be biased (Whitmore 2002).  Our identification strategy allows us to better 
isolate the impact of food stamps on spending. 
Labor supply effects of the FSP have been studied by Fraker and Moffitt (1988), Hagstrom 
(1996), and Keane and Moffitt (1998).  This prior literature, using more structural estimation 
methods, finds insignificant or small work disincentive impacts of the food stamp program. For 
example, Moffitt and Fraker find that the FSP reduces hours of work by participants by 1 hour per 
week, or since mean weekly hours worked for Food Stamp participants is about 9.5, a 9 percent 
reduction.   
V. Data 
The PSID is a panel data set collected by the Institute for Social Research (ISR) at the 
University of Michigan.  The PSID began in 1968 with a sample of about 5,000 households 
containing 18,000 individuals, and subsequently all members (and descendants) of these original 
survey families were re-interviewed annually.  The original 1968 sample consists of two subsamples: 
a nationally representative subsample of 3,000 households (Survey Research Center subsample) and 
a subsample of 1,900 households selected from an existing sample of low income and minority 
populations (Survey of Economic Opportunity subsample).  To adjust for this nonrandom 
composition, the PSID includes weights designed to eliminate biases attributable to the oversampling 
of low income groups and to attrition.  All results use the weights provided by the PSID. 15 
The central focus of the PSID is labor market and demographic variables, containing 
substantial detail on income, employment, and family composition.  It also includes annual food 
(cash) expenditures for food consumed at home, away from home, and food purchased with food 
stamps (the value of food purchased less the purchase requirement). These data have been used by 
many researchers examining impacts of social programs on consumption (for example see Blundell 
and Pistaferri 2003, Gruber 1997, 2000, and Hubbard et al. 1995). In addition, we measure the head’s 
employment status, annual hours worked, annual earnings, and total family income.  
The public use release of the PSID includes state level identifiers for each year.  In addition, 
we have obtained county level identifiers for each family in each year through special arrangement 
with the ISR.  
We use data from interview years 1968 to 1978.  We stop the sample in 1978 so that our 
entire analysis period is before the end of the purchase requirement (which occurred in 1979).   For 
our analysis of food consumption, we exclude interview years 1968 and 1973 (although we use all 
years 1968-1978 for the analysis of labor supply). We drop 1973 because the food consumption 
variables were not included in that survey and we drop 1968 because of inconsistencies in the 
definition of the food variables in that year.
19  In our main estimates, we also trim observations with 
unusual values for food expenditures.  In particular, we drop observations where the ratio of food 
spending to income exceeds 0.85, where total annual food expenditures were less than $100 (in 2005 
dollars) or where annual family income was less than $500 (in 2005 dollars). A test of sensitivity to 
these excluded observations is included in Table 8. 
There is some ambiguity in what time frame the food variables correspond to.  In general, the 
                                                 
19 In particular, the food stamp variable is measured more broadly as food assistance in 1968 and includes 
commodity distribution program, food stamp program, and other in-kind benefits. As a consequence, we find 
nontrivial food stamp (=food assistance) participation rates in 1968 in counties that do not as of yet have food stamp 
programs in place. Further, the cost of meals away from home is defined more broadly than in later years and the 
amounts are bracketed.  16 
survey is taken in spring and families are asked about “typical food consumption.”
20 The PSID then 
annualizes this measure and applies it to the prior calendar year.  Nonetheless we assume, as other 
researchers have, that the food spending variables apply to this year (Blundell and Pistaferi 2003, 
Gruber 1997, 2000, Hubbard et al. 1995, and Zeldes 1989). All labor supply, earnings, and income 
variables correspond to the prior calendar year. 
Unlike virtually all other U.S. public assistance programs there is no categorical eligibility 
for the food stamp program.  That is, eligibility depends on income and asset tests but it is not 
targeted on particular demographic groups, such as single parents with children. Table 2 presents 
food stamp participation rates by education, family type and race based on the 1976-78 waves of the 
PSID.  We use these years because all counties were participating in the program by 1976, but this 
period is prior to the elimination of the purchase requirement in 1979.
21  These tabulations show that 
while food stamp participation is highest among single parent families with children, the 
participation is widespread across all demographic groups. For example, among families where the 
head has less 12 years of education, 46 percent of single parent families with children, 14 percent of 
married couples with children, 14 percent of single nonelderly persons with no children, and 10 
percent of single elderly participate in food stamps. The rates are uniformly higher among black 
families, with 56 percent of single nonelderly parent families with children (where the head has less 
than 12 years of education) participating in food stamps.  
To take advantage of the universal nature of the FSP and to increase the power of our 
analysis, our base case model includes all families and singles headed by a nonelderly person.
22 To 
capture their varying risks of being treated, however, in econometric model (below) we multiply the 
                                                 
20 Specifically, spending on food at home and food out were first asked about “weekly” (1968-69), then for “last 
year” (1970-76), then finally settled into “annual spending” starting in 1976. Between 1968 and 1974 respondents 
were asked to report food stamp receipt “last year,” but it is thought that most respondents answered about their 
current status.  As a result, starting in 1975 the question was changed to inquire about food stamp receipt “last 
month.”   
21 The participation rates are very similar when tabulated on the larger sample sizes of the Current Population 
Survey in 1980 (the first year in which food stamp information is available).  
22 We limit the analysis to the nonelderly because of low take up rates among the elderly (Currie 2003, Haider et al. 
2003). The results are qualitatively unchanged when we include the elderly.  17 
FSP treatment dummy by a group level food stamp participation rate (Bleakley 2007). Specifically, 
we use the 1976-78 PSID to calculate FSP participation rates by education (<12, 12, >12), race 
(white, nonwhite), marital status (married, not married) and presence of children (yes, no).  We also 
present estimates for two sub-samples of the PSID—female headed households with children, and 
nonwhite female headed households with children. These samples are chosen because they are most 
likely to be impacted by the program. 
Descriptive statistics for the consumption sample are presented in Appendix Table 2.  There 
are a total of 39,623 (person-year) observations in the pooled sample, with 6,002 for all female heads 
and 4,501 for nonwhite female heads. All dollar amounts are in 2005 dollars and we use separate 
CPIs for food at home and food away from home.  The descriptive statistics for the labor supply 
sample are presented in Appendix Table 3. 
To augment our analysis of the work disincentive effects of the FSP, we also use the 
Decennial Census.  The challenge is that our identification strategy relies on identifying counties 
which we need to assign the FSP treatment. The public release Census microdata, unfortunately, do 
not include county identifiers. We instead use county level tabulations of the full census which the 
Census Department releases as separate data products. We use these STF (summary tape file) data to 
construct county panels for 1960, 1970, and 1980.  The limitation of this data is that we can only use 
the variables that have been released with the data and that are consistently available over the three 
censuses.  The outcome variables we examine include: male and female labor force participation 
rates and the percent of families with family income in excess $10,000 (in 1979 dollars). These are 
aggregate county outcomes and can not be refined for groups most likely to be impacted by the 
FSP.
23 
                                                 
23 The smallest geographic area identified in the census micro data is the county group.  We also estimated models 
using the 1970 and 1980 public use micro data IPUMS data (there is no microdata for 1960). The advantage of using 
the IPUMS is that we can construct the variables we would like for the treatment groups we like. However, we have 
to aggregate the FSP treatment across all counties in the country group. Further, we had to combine county groups to 
accommodate the changing county group boundaries between the 1970 and 1980 Census. In the end, this 
aggregation was substantial and the results had very low power. The results are available on request. 18 
We merge the PSID and Census data using the county identifiers, with 1960 county 
characteristics (from the City and County Data Book), annual per capita county transfers (from the 
BEA) and the FSP policy variables (from the USDA). 
VI. Methodology 
  Our data discussed above consists of household level data with geographic indicators that 
span the period during which the FSP is introduced.  By pooling periods, we can control for area and 
time fixed effects.  This helps to address the concerns arising from the voluntary nature of the FSP 
introduction across counties.   
Although our identification strategy is based on a person’s county of residence, the 
probability of being impacted by the program varies widely across people within a county. Program 
participation varies widely with education, race and family type as shown in Table 2. To account for 
this variation in program participation, we multiply the food stamp treatment variable–which varies 
at the county-by-year level–by a group specific FSP participation rate.  This approach has been used 
in other recent studies such as Banarjee et al. (2007) and Bleakley (2007). In particular, we estimate 
the following model where the unit of observation is the family-year:  
(2)  16 0 2 ict ct g it c ct g g c t ict yF S P P X Z t T P t α δβ γ γ θ θ η λ ε = + + + ∗+ + + ∗+ + +  
where yict is the outcome variable,  FSPct is an indicator variable equal to 1 if county c in year t has a 
FSP program, Xit are family characteristics, Zc60 are 1960 county characteristics, TPct  are per capita 
county transfer income variables, ηc are county fixed effects and λt are time fixed effects. (We 
estimate additional specifications with state linear time trends and state-year fixed effects.) Pg is the 
group (g) specific food stamp participation rate; we use 24 groups defined by race (white, nonwhite), 
marital status (married, not married), presence of children (yes, no), and education (<12, 12, >12).  
We also include fixed effects for each group and for group interacted with linear time. 
The individual controls X include controls for education, race, urban location, state 
unemployment rate, and for the food consumption models the log of family cash income. As 19 
suggested by Currie (2003), X includes a full set of fixed effects for the number of children and 
number of adults in the family to control nonparametrically for the differences in food needs across 
families.  All estimates are weighted using the PSID family weight and the standard errors are 
clustered on county. 
  We also present estimates that limit the sample to groups that had high participation rates: 
unmarried women with children, and the further subset of nonwhite unmarried mothers.  In this case, 
we do not interact the FSP variable with Pg as in equation (2), and instead estimate the following 
model: 
(3)   16 0 2 ict ct it c ct c t ict yF S P X Z t T P α δβ γ γ η λ ε =+ + + ∗ + + ++  
where all variables are defined as above. These sample restrictions reduce the number of available 
observations by more than 80 percent, and generally provide less precise estimates.   
  In addition, a series of placebo tests are presented in Table 7.  These are estimated using the 
specification in equation (3), but the sample is limited to groups that have low FSP participation rates 
such as high education married couples with children. 
  As described above, the food variables in the PSID measure expenditures as of the interview 
which is fielded in spring of each year. Thus t in (2) and (3) above refers to the interview year. Given 
this timing, we set the treatment variable FSPct to 1 if county c has a FSP program in place by 
January of year t. When examining the labor supply and income, the variables refer to the calendar 
year prior to the interview year.  In that case, t refers to the year prior to the interview year and we 
define the treatment variable to be 1 if county c has a FSP in place by January of the year prior to the 
interview year.
24  
  We include the pre-treatment county variables (Zc60) interacted with linear time trends to 
control for the observable determinants of county food stamp adoption (Table 1).  The variables in Z 
                                                 
24 There is some evidence (Berry 1984) that it took some time to ramp up the new county FSP programs. We have 
explored the sensitivity to lagging the treatment effects and while the specific estimates change somewhat, the 
results are qualitatively similar.  20 
include the log of the population, the percent of land in farming and the percent of population black, 
urban, age less than five, age greater than 65 and with income less than $3,000 each interacted with a 
linear time trend.  We include the county transfer variables TPct to control for the possible coincident 
expansions of other transfer programs during this period.  In particular, we include three per capita 
annual county transfer income variables: (1) retirement and disability programs, (2) medical care 
(Medicare, Medicare, and military health care), and (2) cash public assistance (AFDC, SSI, and 
general assistance).   
VII. Results for Expenditures on Food 
  We begin with the overall pooled sample and the estimation approach described in equation 
(2).  To reflect differing probabilities of being affected by the program, we interact the treatment 
dummy with a group specific FSP participation rate.  Note that with this interaction, the parameter 
estimates represent impacts for families that take up the program (e.g. no post-estimation scaling 
needs to be done). The main results, presented in Table 3, provide estimates for three outcome 
variables: the log of real expenditures on food at home, a dummy for any meals out, and the log of 
real total food expenditures. Expenditures on food at home includes all cash spending on groceries, 
but does not include cash outlay for food stamps or the value of food purchased with stamps.  The 
meals out variable is equal to one if a household reports spending any money on meals out in a 
typical week. About three quarters of the pooled sample and only about one-half of single mother 
families report any spending on meals out (Appendix Table 2). Finally, total food expenditures 
includes money spent on food at home, food out, and also includes food purchased with food stamps 
and the value of any other free meals or food that the household received. 
We present five specifications.  The first specification includes demographics, the 1960 
county characteristics interacted with linear time, and year and county fixed effects.  In the second 
specification we add state linear time trends.  In the third we add the per capita county transfer 
income variables.  In the fourth, we adopt the basic Engel curve specification and control for the log 21 
of family (cash) income.  We postpone concerns about the possible endogeneity of this variable (due 
to work disincentive impacts of the food stamp program) to the next section. In the final 
specification, we replace the state linear time trends with state-year fixed effects.   
  The first panel finds—as predicted by the theory—a small, negative impact of food stamps 
on out-of-pocket (cash) spending on food at home.  The second panel shows—as expected—a 
reduction in purchase of meals out measured as whether a family reports eating any meals out in the 
past year. Both of these findings are imprecisely measured, however, and not statistically significant.  
Finally, in the third panel, FSP is associated with a statistically significant and robust 18 percent 
increase in total expenditures on food.  Overall, the results in Table 3 are consistent with the 
theoretical predictions but not always statistically significantly so. 
  In this double-log specification, the coefficient on log of real family cash income (not 
reported in the table) estimates a elasticity of food spending with respect to income of 0.30 and 
evaluating at means implies a marginal propensity to consume food out of cash income of 0.09. This 
is quite consistent with the existing literature (summarized above). 
  The results show that adding the controls for the county transfer income (column 3), family 
income (column 4), or including state-by-year fixed effects (column 5) improve precision and the 
overall fit of the model, but make little difference for the parameter estimates.  
Table 4 presents the impact of the program on a sample limited to female-headed households 
with children.  In this case, the first panel displays the impact of the introduction of the program in 
one’s county on an individual’s likelihood of receiving any food stamps.  The results show 
consistently that the introduction of the food stamp program leads to increases in food stamp receipt 
(as expected).  We can interpret the coefficient as the effective participation rate.  Note that these 
implied participation rates are somewhat lower than those implied in Table 2 and may be due to a 
program ramp up period taking place. Panels B through D present impacts of the program on food 
spending at home, meals out, and total food spending. To scale up the results to be per food stamp 22 
family, the numbers in italics divide the parameter estimates by the sample mean food stamp 
participation.
25  As with the pooled results in Table 3, the results for female headed households show 
that the introduction of the FSP leads to a large statistically significant increase in total food 
expenditures. Again, we have no statistically significant results for meals out or out of pocket 
spending on food. Interestingly, the magnitude of the results for total food from the targeted sample 
is quite similar to the pooled sample in Table 3. For example, Table 3 shows an 18 percent increase 
in total food expenditures with the introduction of the FSP compared to 26-28 percent in the sample 
of female heads of household (after scaling up by sample participation rate).  
  Table 5 further narrows the sample to include only nonwhite female headed households with 
children.  The results are broadly consistent with the earlier results for the overall sample—negative 
and insignificant impacts on meals out and cash expenditures on food at home and positive impacts 
on total food—but are typically smaller and less precisely estimated.  The overall impact on total 
food expenditures is more muted in this sample, with a 6-13 percent increase (after scaling up by 
sample participation rate).   
  In Tables 4 and 5, as well as Table 3, the results are quite consistent across the specifications. 
For the remainder of the paper, we adopt as our base specification the specification in column (4) 
with state linear time trends, county transfers, and log of family income. 
  Policy analysts have long been interested in the impact of an additional dollar’s worth of 
income on food spending, and whether the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) food varies out of 
cash income versus food stamp income.  One can make a further adjustment of these estimates to 
calculate how the predicted increase in total food expenses compares to the increase in food stamp 
benefits.  Table 6 presents the estimates of the MPC out of both types of income. These MPCs are 
derived from the estimates on treatment dummy and on log(income) in the model of the log of total 
food expenditures. All estimates come from the specification in column (4) of Tables 3-5, with 
                                                 
25 As with the earlier use of food stamp participation rates, here we calculate the mean food stamp participation rate 
using interview years 1976-1978 representing the period after all counties have adopted the program and before the 
purchase requirement is eliminated. 23 
controls for county transfer income and state linear time trends. The MPCs are evaluated at the mean 
values of food spending and income levels among food stamp recipients.  The results in row (1), 
based on the pooled sample, indicate an MPC for food out of food stamp income equal to 0.16 and an 
MPC for food out of cash income of 0.09. In subsequent rows, we present parameter estimates and 
implied MPCs for subgroups with higher probabilities of being impacted by the FSP.
26 Consistent 
with the Engel curve relationship, as the sample becomes more disadvantaged, the MPC food out of 
cash income increases although not dramatically. For example, the MPC food out of cash income 
rises from 0.086 in the full sample to 0.111 in the sample restricted to families with income less than 
or equal to $25,000 (in 2005 dollars). The MPC food out of food stamps also increases as the sample 
becomes more disadvantaged (we will return to this below).
27  
  Returning to the estimates for the full sample in row (1), the results are consistent with the 
theoretical predictions—the MPC food out of food stamps is quite close to the MPC food out of cash 
income. This would suggest that most households are inframarginal. This is in stark contrast to the 
existing literature that finds the MPC food out of food stamps to be 2-10 times larger than the MPC 
food out of cash income. The difference between our results and the previous literature comes fully 
from our lower estimate of MPC food out of food stamp income, which we feel is the result of our 
credible research design. Our estimate of the MPC food out of cash income is estimated from cross-
sectional variation in cash income – similar to the rest of the literature – and is similar in magnitude 
to the older literature. 
  While close in magnitude (and certainly much closer than the prior literature suggested), we 
are still finding that the estimated MPC food out of in-kind transfers (at 0.16) is larger than the MPC 
food out of cash income at (0.09). Thus far, we have maintained that the only reason for a higher 
                                                 
26 Estimates in rows (1)-(6) use the pooled model specification in equation (2), and in particular the treatment 
dummy is interacted with a group FSP participation rate.  Thus the parameter estimates reflect impacts for a treated 
person. In rows (7)-(8), there is no interaction with the FSP participation rate. The numbers in italics scale up the 
parameters by dividing by the sample FSP participation rate as described in the presentation of Table 4. The MPCs 
are directly comparable across samples. 
27 As described above, our estimated MPC food out of food stamps is likely to be larger than it would be if our data 
corresponded to a period without a purchase requirement. 24 
MPC food out of food stamps compared to the MPC food out of cash income is that households are 
constrained by the in-kind nature of the program (as illustrated in Figure 6c). There are, however, 
other reasons why the MPCs may differ. The family member with control over food stamp benefits 
may be different from the person that controls earnings and other cash income. If the person with 
control over food stamps has greater preferences for food, then we may find that the MPC food out of 
food stamps is higher than the MPC food out of cash income.  Alternatively, it is possible that the in-
kind transfer sets a mental target for how much a family “should” spend on food, and as a result 
alters a family’s preferences toward consuming at the budget kink point. Finally, families may 
perceive that food stamp benefits are a more permanent source of income compared to earnings. 
  Returning to Table 6, we find that as the sample becomes more disadvantaged (cutting on 
income, education, or race) the MPC food out of food stamps rises relative to the MPC food out of 
cash income, suggesting that more of the lowest-income households are located at the kink. This is to 
be expected, as the budget constraint is shifted out further for lower-income families because the 
absolute level of food stamp transfers is higher for the poorest families. If preferences are constant 
between the higher and lower income groups, it is straightforward to show that a larger shift out in 
the budget set will lead to a greater likelihood of locating at the kink for the more disadvantaged 
sample. Whitmore (2002) found a similar result when comparing responses to food stamp programs 
in Alabama and San Diego. Overall, however, while the ratio of the MPCs rises at the highest (for the 
sample of nonwhite nonelderly families) to 3.7, most of our estimates imply the ratio is 2.5 or lower.  
One should be cautious in interpreting these “marginal” calculations for food stamp income 
because of the nonmarginal nature of the research design – i.e. the design compares spending when 
there was no program to spending after the program was introduced.  On the other hand, the MPC for 
income is identified off of cross-sectional variation in cash income, and is subject to the usual 
criticisms of this type of identification.  
Sensitivity Checks 25 
  We conducted many specification tests. First, in Table 7 we present placebo tests—that is, we 
estimate the models for groups that are not expected to be impacted by the food stamp program. In 
these and all other specification tests, we use the model with state linear time trends and controls for 
county per capita transfers and log(family cash income). We estimate the models for high income 
(more than $50,000 in 2005 dollars) families, high income married couples with children, and white 
high educated (college educated or more) families with children. The results, as expected, show no 
significant impacts of the FSP on food consumption for any of these groups.  In fact, here the point 
estimates on our most robustly estimated outcome—total food expenditures—while small is negative 
compared to the consistently positive estimates for the likely impacted groups. 
  Further specification testing is provided in Tables 8 and 9.  We present the specification tests 
for the pooled sample of all nonelderly in the PSID, with the treatment dummy interacted with the 
group specific FS participation rate. (The results are qualitatively the same for the female headed 
sample and the nonwhite female headed sample.)  Panel A of Table 8 presents estimates where we 
drop all observations with minor or major imputations to the food variables. Imputations represent 
about one to five percent of observations depending on the variable.  Panel B of Table 8 presents 
estimates where we add back in the observations that were trimmed from the original dataset because 
of unusual food consumption data. The results change little with these changes in sample.  
  In panel C of Table 8 we test for policy endogeneity by adding a one year lead of the county 
FSP implementation.  If this were statistically significant, that would suggest that there were 
underlying trends in food consumption that are correlated with the county FSP adoption leading to 
spurious estimated impacts of FSP.  The coefficients on the policy lead variables are small and often 
opposite-signed compared to the actual policy variable.
28 
  Table 9 explores the sensitivity of the results to the particular functional form specified.  
                                                 
28 In results not presented here, we also explored whether the treatment effect varies over time by adding an 
interaction between the treatment effect and a dummy for 1973 or later.  Time varying treatments might result 
because the early adopting counties were more enthusiastic about the program than the counties that were forced 
into compliance. However, we find no evidence of differences over time. We also estimated models adding back in 
the 1968 data. The results, while changing somewhat, provide the same qualitative conclusions. 26 
Column (1) of the top panel restates the main results of the paper found in column (4) from Table 3, 
estimated as the log of food spending on the availability of the food stamp program along with the 
log of income.  Subsequent columns experiment with including food spending and cash income in 
levels, and including a quadratic in income.  To compare the results across specifications, the implied 
MPCs out of food stamp and cash income are reported at the bottom of the table.  The results of the 
introduction of the food stamp program are similar across specifications, although allowing less 
curvature in the relationship between cash income and food spending tends to reduce the MPC out of 
income.  The bottom panel repeats the exercise, limiting the sample to those with relatively low 
levels of family income.  The estimated MPCs out of food stamp income are larger among the more 
targeted group compared to the top panel, and the estimated impact of the program is quite robust 
across specifications. 
  As discussed earlier, the expansion of the food stamp program took place during a time of 
great change in the U.S. system of government support.  We address this by controlling for the 
county level transfer variables.  Another, more direct approach, is to examine the impact of the FSP 
on family government transfer income.  In particular, with the PSID we can measure income of the 
head and wife from AFDC, other welfare income (SSI, General Assistance), and social security.  The 
results of that exercise, presented in Table 10, show no significant impact of the FSP on other sources 
of income support.       
  In sum, the results in this section show that the food stamp program is associated with 
increases in total food consumption and (less consistently) decreases in out of pocket food spending. 
The results are robust to including state linear time trends, state-year fixed effects, and do not appear 
to be the result of other program expansions during this time period.  
VIII. Results for Work Disincentive Effects 
  The FSP has the structure of an income support program.  A family is eligible for a given 
level of food stamps (“the guarantee”) which decreases as earnings increase.  The combination of the 27 
income effect of the benefit as well as the substitution effect from the benefit reduction rate leads, 
unambiguously, to a predicted decline in employment, hours worked, and (if wages are fixed) 
earnings.  In addition, family income—which as measured here as cash income and does not include 
food stamp benefits—is also expected to fall. It is important to establish whether there are work 
disincentives of the program because the impacts of a reduction in earnings may offset gains in 
additional food consumption.  The prior literature, which is based mostly on structural estimation, 
finds little or no impact of the FSP on labor supply.  Here we take a very different approach by using 
the introduction of food stamps. 
  PSID results for the full nonelderly sample, as well as female heads and nonwhite female 
heads (paralleling Tables 3-5) are presented in Table 11.  As above, the parameter estimates in the 
pooled models reflect impacts for a “treated” family. For the female headed household samples, we 
provide in italics the equivalent scaled estimates (which are equal to the parameter estimates divided 
by the sample FSP participation rate). We present estimates for whether the head worked at all last 
year, the head’s annual hours last year, the head’s annual earnings last year, and the total family 
income. Note that hours and earnings are unconditional measures – that is, they include 
nonworkers.
29 Thus any impact on hours or earnings will reflect both intensive and extensive labor 
margins.  
  Across all outcomes and all three samples, each of the point estimates is consistent with the 
theoretical predictions of decreases in employment, hours, earnings and income. However, few 
estimates are statistically significant. There is a large, statistically significant decrease in whether the 
head reports any work in the pooled sample, and annual hours worked in the female heads and 
nonwhite female heads samples are estimated to decline significantly with food stamp 
implementation. The results for annual hours worked suggest a reduction of 12 to 16 percent.  
  We also examine the impacts on labor supply using decennial Census data. The only public 
                                                 
29 Family income is specified in log form. Because they include zeros, the head’s earnings are specified in levels.   28 
use release of the Census that identifies the county of residence is county-level aggregate files—
known as the STF files.  Using that data, we estimate models of labor force participation rates for all 
females and males (aged 16 and over), and all females with a child under age six.  Lastly, we can 
examine the propensity to have family income in excess of 10,000 in real 1979 dollars.  We estimate 
models similar to those presented above, with decade fixed effects replacing the year fixed effects. 
Because the observations are at the county-year level, we do not include any demographic 
characteristics and the regression is weighted using the county population. As above, standard errors 
are clustered on county. The results are presented in Table 12—with panel A reporting estimates for 
all persons and panel B reporting estimates for nonwhites (for variables that are available).   
  It is important to note that these treatment groups are broader than the targeted samples used 
in the PSID and there is no way to weight the treatment by group participation rate (as in our pooled 
sample) because the data are county wide averages. With that said, the results show a relatively 
statistically precise, small negative estimated work disincentive effect. For example, the estimate for 
males shows that implementing a food stamp program leads to a statistically significant 0.003 
decrease in the labor force participation rate compared to the mean value of 0.76.  In addition, the 
probability that overall family cash income (not including food stamps) is less than $10,000 per year 
(in 1979 dollars) increases by a statistically significant 1-3 percentage points.   
  Together, these results suggest that there is a small, negative impact on income and work 
associated with the food stamp program. The relative modest size of these effects is perhaps not 
surprising given the low (for income support programs) benefit reduction rate of 30% in the food 
stamp program. In the AFDC/TANF program where the work disincentive effects are estimated to be 
much larger (Moffitt 1992) the benefit reduction rate is closer to 100 percent. However, as a check 
and to gauge the magnitude of the expected labor supply effects of the food stamp program, we 
simulated the impact of the program on annual hours worked in our PSID sample using estimated 
labor supply elasticities from the Negative Income Tax experiments (Robins and West 1983). These 29 
simulations show that the food stamp program is expected to lead to about a 100 hour reduction in 
annual hours worked among our female heads of household sample (compared to our estimate of a 
165 hour reduction in Table 11). Note that the simulations predict only the intensive margin effect, 
and are therefore expected to be below our estimates which capture the extensive and intensive 
margin impacts. The simulations for the full or pooled sample predicted a 30 hour reduction in hours, 
which scaled up by the group FS participation rate represents about a 350 hour reduction in hours 
somewhat larger than our (insignificant) estimated 229 reduction in Table 11. Overall, we take this as 




  In this paper we present evidence on the effect of the largest near-cash transfer program – 
food stamps – on the consumption and labor supply of the poor.  The overall program effects of the 
Food Stamp Program have been difficult for researchers to isolate, because there is little cross-state 
or over-time program variation to exploit.  Here we use county-level variation in the original 
adoption of the program from 1963-1975 to identify the impact of food stamps.  Using the PSID and 
Census data, we find that the FSP significantly increases food consumption, and causes a small 
negative impact on work behavior of the poor. By introducing and developing this research design, 
the paper provides an important contribution to the literature on evaluating the behavioral impacts of 
transfer programs.  
  Perhaps more importantly, the paper tests the economics of in-kind transfers.  Economic 
theory has strong predictions about how consumers will reallocate their spending in response to in-
kind transfers.  Despite the well known theoretical predictions, there has been relatively little 
                                                 
30 More specifically, we assign the compensated wage and income effects based on family type (female headed 
households are assigned the effects for “single females” and all male headed singles/families are assigned the effects 
for “husbands”). We assign maximum food stamp benefits and the food stamp breakeven income level by family 
size using the 1975 food stamp parameters in Table 2.2 from MacDonald (1977). We assume no nonlinear response 
to the implementation of food stamps and therefore simulate the change in hours for those families with head’s 
earnings below the food stamps breakeven point. Full results of simulation available on request.  30 
empirical work to test those predictions. We find that the poor react to in-kind transfers by reducing 
their out-of-pocket spending on the targeted good, just as theory predicts.  But total consumption of 
the targeted good from all sources – cash outlays and in-kind transfers – increases.  Additionally we 
find that, consistent with theory, providing the food stamp benefits in voucher form leads to a 
minimal distortion of the consumption choice relative to what it would be if the benefit were 
provided in cash. This is in stark contrast to the findings in the existing literature, which use data and 
methods from more than two decades ago. 
  Our findings, then, contribute to the literature in two distinct ways. First, we provide 
important and new estimates of the impact of the food stamp program on consumption and labor 
supply using a credible research design. Second, we test predictions of the theory of consumer choice 
and in particular the differential impacts of cash versus in kind transfers. 
  Even though there have been changes in the population of the United States and the 
parameters of the Food Stamp Program since the period we are studying, these results are relevant for 
today’s policy debates. To date, there have been no studies that we have found that provide credible 
evidence on the impact of the FSP on consumption and income.  The FSP is once again receiving 
considerable political attention, and it is crucial from a policy maker’s perspective to be able to 
measure the benefits of the program not only on food spending, but also on other outcomes like 
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Source:  Author’s tabulations of county FSP start dates.  Counties are weighted by their 1960 population. 35 






















































Source: Berry (1984), Table 3.36 




Note: Authors’ tabulations of food stamp administrative data (U.S. Department of Agriculture, various years).37 
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Figure 5:  1960 County Characteristics and County Food Stamp Start Date 
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Note: Each graph provides a scatterplot of a 1960 county characteristic (x-axis) against the food stamp start date (y-
axis) where the points are weighted by the 1960 county population.  The graphs also contain the linear fit where the 
regression is weighted by 1960 county population. 1960 County characteristics are from the 1960 City and County 
Databook and the FSP implementation dates are from U.S. Department of Agriculture (various years).  39 
Figure 6: Food Stamps and Food/Non-Food Consumption: No Purchase Requirement 
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Figure 7: Food Stamps and Food/Nonfood Consumption: With Purchase Requirement  
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Table 1: Determinants of County Level Food Stamp Program Start Date 
Analysis Using the 1960 City and County Data Book 
   All Counties  Limiting to post-pilot counties 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Percent of land in farming  -0.025  0.124  0.114  0.136 
 (0.830)  (0.028)***  (0.027)***  (0.033)*** 
Percent of pop with income<$3000  0.005  -0.544  -0.347  0.085 
 (0.050)  (0.092)***  (0.088)***  (0.147) 
Percent of pop urban  0.214  -0.068  -0.040  -0.001 
 (4.36)**  (0.041)  (0.039)  (0.053) 
Percent of pop black  -0.326  -0.208  -0.212  -0.474 
 (4.36)**  (0.070)***  (0.067)***  (0.145)*** 
Percent of pop age < 5  -3.566  -2.329  -2.954  -3.557 
 (4.92)**  (0.625)***  (0.593)***  (0.786)*** 
Percent of pop age > 65  -1.030  -0.982  -1.133  -3.048 
 (2.49)*  (0.390)**  (0.371)***  (0.524)*** 
log population  -11.229  -9.139  -7.819  -7.335 
 (13.44)**  (0.752)***  (0.718)***  (0.932)*** 
South * % of land in farming        -0.125 
      (0.058)** 
South * % pop with income<$3000        -0.603 
     (0.188)*** 
South * % pop urban        -0.110 
     (0.080) 
South * % pop black        0.373 
      (0.165)** 
South * % pop age < 5        0.787 
      (1.222) 
South * % pop age > 65        3.467 
     (0.754)*** 
South * log population        0.645 
     (1.548) 
State Fixed Effects    X  X  X 
Number of Observations  2,957  2,957  2,939  2,939 
R squared  0.14  0.56  0.55  0.56 
 
Notes: The data is at the county level and the dependent variable is equal to the calendar month (normed to 1 in January 1961) 
that the county began offering the Food Stamp Program. The control variables come from the City and County Databook for 
1960.  Alaska counties are dropped due to missing data on the food stamp program.  Very small counties (with population less 
than 1,000) are dropped because of missing data on some control variables. A small number of counties are dropped because the 
variable percent of land in farming exceeds 100 percent.  Estimates are weighted using the 1960 county population. 42 
Table 2 
Food Stamp Participation Rates by Demographic Group 
 
      Education Group 
   All   Less than HS 
High School 
Grad  More than HS
A. All Races       
All family types  0.08  0.14  0.06  0.02 
Single with children   0.32  0.46  0.23  0.15 
Married with children   0.07  0.14  0.06  0.01 
Single, no children   0.07  0.14  0.05  0.03 
Married, no children   0.02  0.04  0.01  0.01 
Single, no children elderly   0.07  0.10  0.03  0.01 
Married, no children elderly  0.03  0.05  0.00  0.00 
B. White       
All family types  0.05  0.10  0.04  0.02 
Single with children   0.22  0.38  0.14  0.07 
Married with children   0.05  0.12  0.05  0.01 
Single, no children   0.05  0.11  0.04  0.03 
Married, no children   0.01  0.03  0.00  0.01 
Single, no children elderly   0.05  0.07  0.02  0.01 
Married, no children elderly  0.02  0.04  0.00  0.00 
C. Nonwhite       
All family types  0.22  0.28  0.18  0.09 
Single with children   0.51  0.56  0.44  0.43 
Married with children   0.16  0.22  0.14  0.03 
Single, no children   0.13  0.20  0.09  0.04 
Married, no children   0.06  0.10  0.02  0.02 
Single, no children elderly   0.24  0.25  0.11  0.00 
Married, no children elderly  0.10  0.13  0.00  0.00 
 
Notes: Weighted means of food stamp participation rates using families in the 1976-1978 Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics. These years were chosen because by 1976 all counties had implemented food stamp programs yet it was 
before the elimination of the purchase requirement in 1979.43 
Table 3 
Impact of Food Stamp Introduction on Family Food Expenditures 
All Nonelderly Singles and Families 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
A. Log(Real Expenditures on Food at Home)      
County FSP Implemented X  0.061  -0.034  -0.034  -0.042  -0.050 
Group Participation Rate  (0.089)  (0.094) (0.093) (0.085) (0.090) 
Number  of  Observations  39,243 39,243 39,243 39,243 39,243 
R  Squared  0.56 0.56 0.56 0.60 0.61 
B. Any Meals Out (0/1)       
County FSP Implemented X  -0.109  -0.040  -0.040  -0.045  -0.046 
Group Participation Rate  (0.081)  (0.081) (0.082) (0.082) (0.085) 
Number  of  Observations  39,623 39,623 39,623 39,623 39,623 
R  Squared  0.27 0.27 0.27 0.29 0.30 
C. Log (Real Total Food Expenditures)       
County FSP Implemented X  0.212  0.184  0.184  0.174  0.179 
Group Participation Rate  (0.080)*** (0.082)** (0.082)** (0.073)** (0.075)** 
Number  of  Observations  39,623 39,623 39,623 39,623 39,623 
R  Squared  0.53 0.54 0.54 0.60 0.60 
Demographics  X X X X X 
1960 Cty Vars * Linear Time  X  X  X  X  X 
Year and County Fixed Effects  X  X  X  X  X 
Group  Fixed  Effects  X X X X X 
Group * linear time   X  X  X  X  X 
Per Capita Cty Transfers       X  X  X 
Log(Real Family Income)        X  X 
State x Linear Time    X  X  X   
State x Year Fixed Effects              X 
 
Notes: Each parameter is from a separate regression of the outcome variable on the Food Stamp implementation dummy multiplied by a group 
food stamp participation rate. The food stamp implementation dummy equals one if the county-year observation had a food stamp program in 
place by January of that year.  The group food stamp participation rate is calculated for each education-race-marital status-presence of children 
cell using the 1976-1978 PSID. The estimation sample includes all PSID families with nonelderly heads in interview years 1969-1972 and 1974-
1978. There is no food data in 1973 and 1978 is chosen due to the purchase requirement being eliminated is as of 1979. Observations from 
Alaska are dropped because of missing data on food stamp program start date and observations with unusual expenditure values are dropped 
(annual food expenditures less than $100, annual family income less than $500, or income share on food greater than 0.85). All outcome variables 
correspond to annual measures taken as of the interview (in spring of the interview year). Demographic controls include dummies for education, 
number of children, number of adults, race, urban location and state unemployment rate. 1960 county variables include log of population, percent 
of land in farming, percent of population black, urban, age<5, age>65 and with income less than $3,000 each interacted with a linear time trend.  
Per capita county transfer income comes from the BEA REIS and includes measures for public assistance (AFDC, General Assistance), medical 
care (Medicare, Medicaid, military), and retirement and disability benefits. Estimates are weighted using the PSID weight and clustered on 
county.  Standard errors are in parentheses and ***, **, and * indicate that the estimates are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  44 
Table 4 
Impact of Food Stamp Introduction on Family Food Expenditures 
Female Headed Households with Children 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
A. Any Food Stamps (0/1) 
County FSP Implemented  0.158   0.186   0.194   0.200   0.190  
 (0.040)*** (0.040)*** (0.040)*** (0.040)***  (0.040)***
  0.436 0.514 0.536 0.552 0.525 
Number  of  Observations  6002 6002 6002 6002 6002 
R  Squared  0.39 0.40 0.40 0.46 0.49 
B. Log(Real Expenditures on Food at Home) 
County FSP Implemented  -0.008  0.034  0.042  0.031  0.008 
  (0.053) (0.055) (0.055) (0.054) (0.070) 
  -0.022 0.094 0.116 0.086 0.022 
Number  of  Observations  5788 5788 5788 5788 5788 
R  Squared  0.43 0.45 0.45 0.51 0.55 
C. Any Meals Out (0/1) 
County  FSP  Implemented  -0.080 -0.051 -0.055 -0.060 -0.060 
  (0.048)*  (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
  -0.221 -0.141 -0.152 -0.166 -0.166 
Number  of  Observations  6002 6002 6002 6002 6002 
R  Squared  0.36 0.37 0.38 0.40 0.40 
D. Log (Real Total Food Expenditures) 
County  FSP  Implemented  0.039 0.095 0.102 0.095 0.095 
 (0.039)  (0.043)**  (0.042)**  (0.041)**  (0.049)* 
  0.108 0.262 0.282 0.262 0.262 
Number  of  Observations  6002 6002 6002 6002 6002 
R  Squared  0.48 0.49 0.49 0.55 0.58 
Demographics  X X X X X 
1960 Cty Vars * Linear Time  X  X  X  X  X 
Year and County Fixed Effects  X  X  X  X  X 
Per Capita Cty Transfers       X  X  X 
Log(Real Family Income)        X  X 
State x Linear Time    X  X  X   
State x Year Fixed Effects              X 
 
Notes: Each parameter is from a separate regression of the outcome variable on a dummy variable equal to 1 if the county-year observation had a 
food stamp program in place by January of that year.  The sample includes PSID families with children headed by an unmarried woman using 
interview years 1969-1972 and 1974-1978. There is no food data in 1973 and 1978 is chosen due to the purchase requirement being eliminated as 
of 1979. Observations from Alaska are dropped because of missing data on food stamp program start date and observations with unusual 
expenditure values are dropped (annual food expenditures less than $100, annual family income less than $500, or income share on food greater 
than 0.85). All outcome variables correspond to annual measures taken as of the interview (in spring of the interview year). Demographic controls 
include dummies for education, number of children, and number of adults, race, urban location and state unemployment rate. 1960 county 
variables include log of population, percent of land in farming, percent of population black, urban, age<5, age>65 and with income less than 
$3,000 each interacted with a linear time trend. Per capita county transfer income comes from the BEA REIS and includes measures for public 
assistance (AFDC, General Assistance), medical care (Medicare, Medicaid, military), and retirement and disability benefits. Estimates are 
weighted using the PSID weight and clustered on county.  Standard errors are in parentheses and ***, **, and * indicate that the estimates are 
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. The numbers in italics inflate the parameter estimate by the sample food stamp participation rate in 
1978. 45 
Table 5 
Impact of Food Stamp Introduction on Family Food Expenditures 
Nonwhite Female Headed Households with Children 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
A. Any Food Stamps (0/1) 
County FSP Implemented  0.300   0.373   0.379   0.363   0.188  
 (0.053)*** (0.067)*** (0.070)*** (0.074)***  (0.064)***
  0.550 0.684 0.695 0.666 0.345 
Number  of  Observations  4501 4501 4501 4501 4501 
R  Squared  0.33 0.35 0.35 0.40 0.47 
B. Log(Real Expenditures on Food at Home) 
County  FSP  Implemented  -0.031 -0.062 -0.090 -0.067 -0.094 
  (0.077) (0.056) (0.058) (0.054) (0.064) 
  -0.057 -0.114 -0.165 -0.123 -0.172 
Number  of  Observations  4311 4311 4311 4311 4311 
R  Squared  0.39 0.41 0.41 0.48 0.54 
C. Any Meals Out (0/1) 
County  FSP  Implemented  -0.036 -0.066 -0.067 -0.056 -0.013 
  (0.060) (0.058) (0.059) (0.060) (0.070) 
  -0.066 -0.121 -0.123 -0.103 -0.024 
Number  of  Observations  4501 4501 4501 4501 4501 
R  Squared  0.26 0.28 0.28 0.31 0.38 
D. Log (Real Total Food Expenditures) 
County  FSP  Implemented  0.071 0.039 0.036 0.055 0.031 
  (0.060) (0.047) (0.048) (0.045) (0.053) 
  0.130 0.072 0.066 0.101 0.057 
Number  of  Observations  4501 4501 4501 4501 4501 
R  Squared  0.43 0.46 0.46 0.51 0.55 
Demographics  X X X X X 
1960 Cty Vars * Linear Time  X  X  X  X  X 
Year and County Fixed Effects  X  X  X  X  X 
Per Capita Cty Transfers       X  X  X 
Log(Real Family Income)        X  X 
State x Linear Time    X  X  X   
State x Year Fixed Effects              X 
 
Notes: Each parameter is from a separate regression of the outcome variable on a dummy variable equal to 1 if the county-year observation had a 
food stamp program in place by January of that year.  The sample includes PSID families with children headed by an unmarried woman using 
interview years 1969-1972 and 1974-1978.  There is no food data in 1973 and 1978 is chosen due to the purchase requirement being eliminated is 
as of 1979. Observations from Alaska are dropped because of missing data on food stamp program start date and observations with unusual 
expenditure values are dropped (annual food expenditures less than $100, annual family income less than $500, or income share on food greater 
than 0.85). All outcome variables correspond to annual measures taken as of the interview (in spring of the interview year). Demographic controls 
include dummies for education, number of children, number of adults, race, urban location and state unemployment rate. 1960 county variables 
include log of population, percent of land in farming, percent of population black, urban, age<5, age>65 and with income less than $3,000 each 
interacted with a linear time trend.. Per capita county transfer income comes from the BEA REIS and includes measures for public assistance 
(AFDC, General Assistance), medical care (Medicare, Medicaid, military), and retirement and disability benefits. Estimates are weighted using 
the PSID weight and clustered on county.  Standard errors are in parentheses and ***, **, and * indicate that the estimates are significant at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels. The numbers in italics inflate the parameter estimate by the sample food stamp participation rate in 1978. 46 
Table 6 
Estimated Marginal Propensities to Consume Food Out of Food Stamps and Income 
     




Coef (SE)  
FS Elig 






(1) All nonelderly singles and families  39,623 0.174  0.295   0.163  0.086 
   (0.073)** (0.007)***  
(2) Nonelderly <=$50,000  23,660 0.227  0.270   0.209  0.086 
   (0.072)*** (0.012)***   
(3) Nonelderly <=$35,000  16,079 0.228  0.262   0.201  0.091 
   (0.083)*** (0.015)***   
(4) Nonelderly, <=$25,000  13,048 0.282   0.285   0.238  0.111 
   (0.114)** (0.024)***   
(5) Nonelderly, head<=12 yrs of educ  30,905 0.228   0.278   0.219  0.084 
   (0.069)*** (0.008)***   
(6) Nonelderly, nonwhite  15,990 0.258   0.270   0.317  0.086 
   (0.079)*** (0.014)***   
(7) All female heads  6,002  0.095  0.289   0.297  0.098 
   (0.041)** (0.019)***  
   0.262      
(8) Nonwhite female heads  4,501  0.055  0.286   0.165  0.101 
   (0.045) (0.026)***   
   0.101       
                 
 
Notes: Each row reports results from a separate regression of the log of total food spending on the FSP treatment, the log of real family income, 
demographics, county variables, and fixed effects. The results in rows (1)-(6) are estimated on the sample of nonelderly singles and families 
where the specification is identical to column (4) in Table 3. The treatment effect (coefficient on county FSP implementation) is scaled up to 
reflect the impact per food stamp participant family. This is because in the estimating equation the treatment dummy is multiplied by the food 
stamp participation rate, assigned by education-marital status-race-presence of children cells. The results in rows (7)-(8) correspond to the 
specification in column (4) in Tables 4-5. The numbers in italics inflate the treatment effect by the sample food stamp participation rate in 1978. 
See the notes to tables 3-5 for more details. Standard errors are in parentheses and ***, **, and * indicate that the estimates are significant at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels.  Estimates are weighted using the PSID weight and clustered on county.  All samples trim the data to drop observations 
with unusual expenditure values (annual food expenditures less than $100, annual family income less than $500, or income share on food greater 
than 0.85). The marginal propensities to consume food are evaluated at mean values for food expenditures and family income among food stamp 
recipient families.  47 
Table 7 
Impact of Food Stamp Introduction on Family Food Expenditures 
Estimates on Placebo groups 
   Any Food 
Stamps (0/1) 
Log Real Exp on 
Food at Home 
Any Meals Out 
(0/1) 
Log of Real 
Total Food Exp
A. High Income Families (>$50,000 in 2005$)      
County FSP Implemented   0.005  0.002  -0.031  -0.009 
 (0.003)  (0.015)  (0.018)*  (0.014) 
Number of Observations  16,797  16,787  16,797  16,797 
R  Squared  0.10 0.58 0.21  0.51 
B. High Income Married Families with Children (>=$50,000 in 2005$)  
County FSP Implemented   0.004  -0.003  -0.010  -0.023 
  (0.004) (0.018) (0.020)  (0.019) 
Number of Observations  9,814  9,808  9,814  9,814 
R  Squared  0.13 0.51 0.25  0.51 
C. White High Educated Married Families with Children    
County FSP Implemented   0.003  -0.035  -0.016  -0.066 
  (0.003) (0.033) (0.035)  (0.032)** 
Number of Observations  1,947  1,947  1,947  1,947 
R  Squared  0.29 0.67 0.30  0.67 
 
Notes: Each parameter is from a separate regression of the outcome variable on a dummy variable equal to 1 if the county-year observation had a 
food stamp program in place by January of that year.  The models correspond to specification (4) in Table 4. See the notes to that table for more 
details. Standard errors are in parentheses and ***, **, and * indicate that the estimates are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  Estimates 
are weighted using the PSID weight and clustered on county.  Each panel corresponds to estimates from a different sample. The first panel 
includes families where family income exceeds $50,000. The second panel takes the high income sample and restricts it further to include 
married families with children. The third panel includes white married families with children where the head has 16 or more years of education. 
All samples trim the data to drop observations with unusual expenditure values (annual food expenditures less than $100, annual family income 
less than $500, or income share on food greater than 0.85).48 
Table 8 
Impact of Food Stamp Introduction on Family Food Expenditures 
Specification Tests: All nonelderly singles and families 
   Log Real Exp on 
Food at Home 
Any Meals Out 
(0/1) 
Log of Real 
Total Food Exp 
A. Drop allocated observations      
County FSP Implemented X  -0.036  -0.061  0.164 
    Group participation rate  (0.085)  (0.081)  (0.073)** 
Number of Observations  37,172  39,211  37,088 
R Squared  0.61  0.30  0.60 
B. Add in trimmed observations      
County FSP Implemented X  -0.037  -0.048  0.189 
    Group participation rate  (0.087)  (0.081)  (0.077)** 
Number of Observations  40,005  41,047  40,785 
R Squared  0.58  0.29  0.57 
C. Add lead of policy variable      
County FSP Implemented X  -0.056  -0.074  0.162 
    Group participation rate  (0.083)  (0.096)  (0.072)** 
Lead of County FSP X  0.035  0.072  0.028 
    Group participation rate  (0.104)  (0.116)  (0.107) 
Number of Observations  39,243  39,623  39,623 
R Squared  0.60  0.29  0.60 
 
Notes: Each parameter is from a separate regression of the outcome variable on a dummy variable equal to 1 if the county-year observation had a 
food stamp program in place by January of that year interacted with a group specific food stamp participation rate.  The models correspond to 
specification (4) in Table 5 and are based on the sample of nonelderly singles and families. See the notes to that table for more details. Standard 
errors are in parentheses and ***, **, and * indicate that the estimates are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  Estimates are weighted 
using the PSID weight and clustered on county.  Each panel corresponds to estimates from a different sample or specification. Panel A drops 
observations where any food expenditure variables have been allocated (imputed). Panel B adds back in the trimmed observations (those with 
annual food expenditures less than $100, annual family income less than $500, or income share on food greater than 0.85).  Panel C includes a 
one year lead of the policy variable.  49 
Table 9 
Impact of Food Stamp Introduction on Total Food Expenditures 
Sensitivity to Alternative Functional Form 
 
Specification log-log  semi-log  linear  quadratic 
Dependent Variable  log(total food) total food exp total food exp  total food exp
Income   log(income)  log(income)  income  quad income 
All Nonelderly singles and families    
County FSP Implemented X  0.174  975  1138  1110 
     Group participation rate  (0.073)** (613)  (611)* (603)* 
log(income) 0.295  2,150       
  (0.007)*** (85)***    
income     0.038  0.048 
   (0.002)***  (0.003)***
income squared (/$10,000)        0.000 
      (0.000)***
Number of Observations  39,623  39,623  39,623  39,623 
R squared  0.60  0.57  0.59  0.59 
Estimated MPC food stamps  0.163  0.127  0.148  0.145 
Estimated MPC income  0.086   0.087   0.038   0.048  
Nonelderly singles and families with family income<$50,000 (2005$)  
County FSP Implemented X  0.227  1620  1670  1656 
     Group participation rate  (0.072)*** (523)*** (523)*** (522)*** 
log(income) 0.270  1,163       
  (0.012)*** (54.461)***    
income     0.051  0.070 
   (0.003)***  (0.009)***
income squared (/$10,000)        -0.003 
      (0.002)** 
Number of Observations  23,660  23,660  23,660  23,660 
R squared  0.51  0.53  0.53  0.53 
Estimated MPC food stamps  0.209  0.217  0.224  0.222 
Estimated MPC income  0.086  0.054  0.051  0.057 
 
Notes: Each column presents estimates from a regression of total food expenditures on a dummy variable equal to 1 if the county-year 
observation had a food stamp program in place by January of that year interacted with the group participation rate.  The models differ with 
respect to the functional form (logs or levels for dependent variable, logs or levels for income). All other control variables and sample selection 
correspond to specification (4) in Table 3. See the notes to that table for more details. Standard errors are in parentheses and ***, **, and * 
indicate that the estimates are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  Estimates are weighted using the PSID weight and clustered on county.  
The marginal propensities to consume food are evaluated at mean values for food expenditures and family income among food stamp recipient 
families. 50 
Table 10 
Impact of Food Stamp Introduction on Family Transfer Income (2005 dollars) 
All nonelderly singles and families 
  
(1) (2) 
AFDC income (2005$)    
County FSP Implemented X  773  840 
    Group participation rate  (968)  (969) 
Number of Observations  44,098  44,098 
R Squared  0.24  0.24 
Other cash welfare (2005$)    
County FSP Implemented X  506  495 
    Group participation rate  (628)  (631) 
Number of Observations  40,299  40,299 
R Squared  0.12  0.12 
Social Security Income (2005$)    
County FSP Implemented X  -1213  -1226 
    Group participation rate  (1633)  (262) 
Number of Observations  40,299  40,299 
R Squared  0.14  0.14 
Demographics X  X 
1960 Cty Vars * Linear Time  X  X 
Year and County Fixed Effects  X  X 
Per Capita Cty Transfers     X 
State x Linear Time  X  X 
 
Notes: Each parameter is from a separate regression of the outcome variable on a dummy variable equal to 1 if the county-year observation had a 
food stamp program in place by January of the year prior to the interview year interacted with a group specific food stamp participation rate. The 
sample includes nonelderly singles and families from the PSID for interview years 1968-1978. The sample ends in 1978 due to the purchase 
requirement being eliminated is as of 1979. All other control variables and sample selection correspond to specification (4) in Table 3. See the 
notes to that table for more details. All outcome variables correspond to annual measures for the year prior to the interview and are expressed in 
real 2005 dollars.  Estimates are weighted using the PSID weight and clustered on county.  Standard errors are in parentheses and ***, **, and * 
indicate that the estimates are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  51 
Table 11 
Impact of Food Stamp Introduction on Labor Supply and Income 
   Head any 










All Nonelderly Singles and Families        
County FSP Implemented  X  -0.179  -229  -4716  0.017 
    Group participation rate (0.074)*  (156)  (4848)  (0.092) 
Number of Observations  48,168  48,168  48,168  48,168 
R Squared  0.22  0.30  0.39  0.51 
Mean of dependent variable  0.86  1,947  $41,742  10.76 
All Female Headed Families         
County FSP Implemented   -0.066  -165.1  -842  -0.055 
 (0.043)  (69.3)**  (1001)  (0.040) 
  -0.182 -456  -2326  -0.152 
Number of Observations  7,281  7,281  7,281  7,281 
R Squared  0.38  0.42  0.49  0.50 
Mean of dependent variable  0.58  1,068  $14,187  10.19 
Nonwhite Female Headed Families        
County FSP Implemented   -0.018  -136  -590  -0.023 
 (0.052)  (71.2)*  (946)  (0.052) 
  -0.033 -249  -1083  -0.042 
Number of Observations  5,465  5,465  5,465  5,465 
R Squared  0.33  0.39  0.40  0.45 
Mean of dependent variable  0.48  863  $10,008  9.94 
Demographics X  X  X  X 
1960 County Variables * Linear Time  X  X  X  X 
Year and County Fixed Effects  X  X  X  X 
Per Capita County Transfers   X  X  X  X 
State x Linear Time  X  X  X  X 
 
Notes: Each parameter is from a separate regression of the outcome variable on a dummy variable equal to 1 if the county-year observation had a 
food stamp program in place by January of the year prior to the interview year. The policy variable is multiplied by a group specific food stamp 
participation rate for the results in the first panel, for all nonelderly singles and families. The sample comes from the PSID for interview years 
1968-1978. The sample ends in 1978 due to the purchase requirement being eliminated is as of 1979. All other control variables and sample 
selection correspond to specification (4) in Tables 3-5.  All outcome variables correspond to annual measures for the year prior to the interview 
(except the first column which is at the time of the survey) and all dollar amounts are expressed in real 2005 dollars. Estimates are weighted using 
the PSID weight and clustered on county.  Standard errors are in parentheses and ***, **, and * indicate that the estimates are significant at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
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Table 12 
Impact of Food Stamp Introduction on Labor Supply and Family Income 
1960, 1970, 1980 Census STF Analysis 
 








Family Income < 
$10,000 (1979$) 
A. All Races       
County FSP Implemented   -0.002  -0.003  0.004  0.009 
 (0.001)  (0.001)**  (0.008)  (0.002)*** 
Number of Observations  7,898  7,898  7,898  7,898 
Mean of dep variable  0.396  0.762  0.337  0.238 
B. Nonwhites       
County FSP Implemented   0.002  -0.004  n/a  0.027 
 (0.004)  (0.003)    (0.006)*** 
Number of Observations  7,443  7,321    7,093 
Mean of dep variable  0.457  0.703    0.455 
1960 Cty Vars * decade fixed effects  X  X  X  X 
Per capital county transfer payments  X  X  X  X 
Decade fixed effects  X  X  X  X 
County fixed effects  X  X  X  X 
 
 
Notes:   Each parameter is from a separate regression of the outcome variable on a dummy variable equal to 1 if the county-year observation had 
a food stamp program in place in that year.   Data is from 1960-1980 Census county level STF files.  Counties in Alaska are dropped because of 
missing data on food stamp program start date. 1960 county variables include log of population, percent of land in farming, percent of population 
black, urban, age<5, age>65 and with income less than $3,000 each interacted with decade fixed effects. Per capita county transfer income comes 
from the BEA REIS and includes measures for public assistance (AFDC, General Assistance), medical care (Medicare, Medicaid, military), and 
retirement and disability benefits. Estimates are weighted using 1960 county population and are clustered on county.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses and ***, **, and * indicate that the estimates are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 53 
Appendix Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for Analysis Using the 1960 City and County Data Book 
 
# nonmissing 
obs. Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
All Races
LFPR Women 16+ 7,898 0.396 0.114 0.051 0.798
LFPR Men 16+ 7,898 0.762 0.058 0.202 0.975
LFPR Women with children<6 7,898 0.337 0.341 0.000 31.329
Family Income<$10,000 (1979$) 7,898 0.238 0.123 0.039 0.872
Year 7,898 1971 8 1960 1980
County FSP implemented 7,898 0.556 0.497 0 1
County % black, 1960 7,898 10.26 11.84 0 83.4
County % urban, 1960 7,898 70.23 28.73 0 100
County % farmland, 1960 7,898 44.42 29.66 0 239.8
County % ≤$3,000, 1960 7,898 21.31 12.94 2.1 78
County % <5 years, 1960 7,898 11.36 1.53 4.7 20.4
County %>65 years, 1960 7,898 9.18 2.70 1 24.9
log(1960 county population) 7,898 12.34 1.72 6.80 15.61
County per cap ret. and dis. payments 7,898 809.2 564.4 0.0 18421.5
County per cap medical payments 7,898 164.2 149.2 0.0 833.2
County per cap cash PA payments 7,898 74.6 100.2 0.0 519.4
Nonwhites
LFPR Women 16+ 7,443 0.457 0.111 0 1
LFPR Men 16+ 7,321 0.703 0.083 0 1
Family Income<$10,000 (1979$) 7,093 0.455 0.186 0 1
Year 7,572 1972 8 1960 1980
County FSP implemented 7,572 0.638 0.481 0 1
County % black, 1960 7,572 19.98 15.43 0 83.4
County % urban, 1960 7,572 75.31 29.53 0 100
County % farmland, 1960 7,572 38.53 28.05 0 239.8
County % ≤$3,000, 1960 7,572 24.61 15.47 2.1 78
County % <5 years, 1960 7,572 11.46 1.63 4.7 20.4
County %>65 years, 1960 7,572 8.60 2.37 1 24.9
log(1960 county population) 7,572 12.73 1.82 6.82 15.61
County per cap ret. and dis. payments 7,572 824.9 482.7 0.0 18421.5
County per cap medical payments 7,572 195.7 165.2 0.0 833.2
County per cap cash PA payments 7,572 109.0 132.8 0.0 519.4 
 
Notes: Data from 1960, 1970, and 1980 county level summary tape files. Counties in Alaska are dropped because of 
missing data on food stamp program start date. All outcome variables refer to the prior calendar year. Statistics are 
weighted using the 1960 county population. 
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Appendix Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for PSID Expenditure Analysis Sample 
# nonmissing 
obs. Mean Min Max
# nonmissing 
obs. Mean Min Max
# nonmissing 
obs. Mean Min Max
FSP participation 39,623 0.066 0 1 6,002 0.297 0 1 4,501 0.459 0 1
Real food at home 39,623 6737 0 35347 6,002 5902 0 24131 4,501 5475 0 23462
log(real food at home) 39,243 8.64 2.63 10.47 5,788 8.52 3.87 10.09 4,311 8.44 3.87 10.06
Any meals out 39,623 0.766 0 1 6,002 0.560 0 1 4,501 0.412 0 1
Real all food 39,623 8179 122.8 40200 6,002 7197 175 35378 4,501 7017 174.9 27782
log(real all food) 39,623 8.86 4.8 10.6 6,002 8.75 5.2 10.5 4,501 8.71 5.2 10.2
Food at home / Income 39,623 0.171 0 0.849 6,002 0.259 0 0.849 4,501 0.301 0 0.849
All food / Income 39,623 0.179 0.003 3.620 6,002 0.287 0.009 2.140 4,501 0.351 0.009 2.140
Real family income 39,623 59643 769 503346 6,002 32625 824 308554 4,501 24780 824 123162
Log(real family income) 39,623 10.77 6.64 13.13 6,002 10.19 6.71 12.64 4,501 9.94 6.71 11.72
Year 39,623 73.78 69 78 6,002 73.94 69 78 4,501 73.96 69 78
County FSP implemented 39,623 0.864 0 1 6,002 0.884 0 1 4,501 0.893 0 1
Urban county 39,623 0.605 0 1 6,002 0.650 0 1 4,501 0.705 0 1
F e m a l e  h e a d e d  h o u s e h o l d 3 9 , 6 2 3 0 . 2 1 501 6 , 0 0 2111 4 , 5 0 1111
Education<12 years 39,623 0.327 0 1 6,002 0.481 0 1 4,501 0.600 0 1
Education=12years 39,623 0.361 0 1 6,002 0.380 0 1 4,501 0.311 0 1
Education>12 years 39,623 0.312 0 1 6,002 0.140 0 1 4,501 0.089 0 1
White 39,623 0.856 0 1 6,002 0.635 0 1 4,501 0 0 0
Number of children 39,623 1.27 0 13 6,002 2.12 1 11 4,501 2.54 1 11
Number of adults 39,623 1.97 1 14 6,002 1.47 1 8 4,501 1.63 1 8
State unemployment rate 39,623 6.19 2 12.5 6,002 6.33 2 12.5 4,501 6.32 2 12.5
County % black, 1960 39,623 9.62 0 81.3 6,002 12.30 0 62.1 4,501 19.60 0.1 62.1
County % urban, 1960 39,623 70.03 0 100 6,002 74.59 0 100 4,501 82.17 0 100
County % farmland, 1960 39,623 44.89 0 239.8 6,002 41.78 0 126.6 4,501 36.51 0 116.2
County % ≤$3,000, 1960 39,623 20.92 5.5 74.4 6,002 20.51 5.5 68 4,501 21.40 5.5 68
County % <5 years, 1960 39,623 11.26 5.6 18.2 6,002 11.22 6.7 18.2 4,501 11.26 7.4 15.1
County %>65 years, 1960 39,623 9.27 1 24.9 6,002 9.22 2.8 24.9 4,501 8.94 2.8 24.9
log(1960 county population) 39,623 12.28 7.72 15.61 6,002 12.62 7.72 15.61 4,501 13.20 8.74 15.61
County per cap ret. and dis. payments 39,623 994.2 112.4 2969.3 6,002 1013.9 172.8 2609.4 4,501 986.8 220.2 2609.4
County per cap medical payments 39,623 226.6 35.0 690.8 6,002 237.3 37.0 686.7 4,501 252.7 65.6 686.7
County per cap cash PA payments 39,623 226.7 0.0 1086.8 6,002 272.2 15.6 1086.8 4,501 330.2 20.0 1086.8
Female Headed Households Nonwhite Female Headed Households All Nonelderly Singles and Families
 
 
Note:  PSID interview years 1969-1972 and 1974-1978. No food data is available in 1973 and 1968 is dropped due to inconsistencies in variable definitions. Observations 
from Alaska are dropped because of missing data on food stamp program start date and observations with unusual expenditure values are dropped (annual food 
expenditures less than $100, annual family income less than $500, or income share on food greater than 0.85). All outcome variables correspond to annual measures taken 
as of the interview (in spring of the interview year).   55 
Appendix Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for PSID Labor Supply Analysis Sample 
# nonmissing 
obs. Mean Min Max
# nonmissing 
obs. Mean Min Max
# nonmissing 
obs. Mean Min Max
Real AFDC income 44,098 339 0 51080 6,674 2703 0 39054 5,014 4498 0 39054
Real Soc security income 40,299 650 0 43400 6,062 2184 0 41453 4,563 1699 0 41453
Real other welfare income 40,299 153 0 40039 6,062 779 0 35122 4,563 1273 0 32099
Head work last week 48,168 0.857 0 1 7,281 0.583 0 1 5,465 0.478 0 1
Head work last year 48,168 0.926 0 1 7,281 0.707 0 1 5,465 0.615 0 1
Head annual hours 48,168 1947 0 5824 7,281 1068 0 4628 5,465 863 0 4628
Head real annual earnings 48,168 41742 0 503346 7,281 14187 0 117854 5,465 10008 0 75516
Real family income 48,168 59228 748 503346 7,281 32683 824 308554 5,465 24901 824 130699
Log(real family income) 48,168 10.76 6.62 13.13 7,281 10.19 6.71 12.64 5,465 9.94 6.71 11.78
Year 48,168 73.18 68 78 7,281 73.42 68 78 5,465 73.42 68 78
County FSP implemented 48,168 0.824 0 1 7,281 0.856 0 1 5,465 0.867 0 1
Urban county 48,168 0.622 0 1 7,281 0.670 0 1 5,465 0.724 0 1
F e m a l e  h e a d e d  h o u s e h o l d 4 8 , 1 6 8001 7 , 2 8 1111 5 , 4 6 5111
Education<12 years 48,168 0.335 0 1 7,281 0.482 0 1 5,465 0.609 0 1
Education=12years 48,168 0.353 0 1 7,281 0.376 0 1 5,465 0.304 0 1
Education>12 years 48,168 0.312 0 1 7,281 0.142 0 1 5,465 0.087 0 1
White 48,168 0.857 0 1 7,281 0.634 0 1 5,465 0.000 0 0
Number of children 48,168 1.29 0 13 7,281 2.15 1 11 5,465 2.57 1 11
Number of adults 48,168 1.98 1 14 7,281 1.48 1 8 5,465 1.62 1 8
State unemployment rate 48,168 5.82 2 12.5 7,281 6.00 2 12.5 5,465 5.99 2 12.5
County % black, 1960 48,168 9.7 0 81.3 7,281 12.4 0 62.1 5,465 19.7 0.1 62.1
County % urban, 1960 48,168 70.2 0 100 7,281 75.0 0 100 5,465 82.0 0 100
County % farmland, 1960 48,168 44.8 0 239.8 7,281 41.4 0 126.6 5,465 36.4 0 116.2
County % ≤$3,000, 1960 48,168 20.9 5.5 74.4 7,281 20.5 5.5 68 5,465 21.5 5.5 68
County % <5 years, 1960 48,168 11.2 5.6 18.2 7,281 11.2 6.7 18.2 5,465 11.3 7.4 15.1
County %>65 years, 1960 48,168 9.3 1 24.9 7,281 9.2 2.8 24.9 5,465 9.0 2.8 24.9
log(1960 county population) 48,168 12.29 7.72 15.61 7,281 12.65 7.72 15.61 5,465 13.19 8.74 15.61
County per cap ret. and dis. payments 48,168 983.0 0 23532 7,281 1025.1 0 23532 5,465 985.2 0 4539
County per cap medical payments 48,168 219.0 0 6647 7,281 236.2 0 6647 5,465 246.4 0 1282
County per cap cash PA payments 48,168 225.0 0 14071 7,281 283.9 0 14071 5,465 332.7 0 2714
Female Headed Households Nonwhite Female Headed Households All Nonelderly Singles and Families
 
 
Note:  PSID interview years 1968-1978. Observations from Alaska are dropped because of missing data on food stamp program start date and observations with unusual 
expenditure values are dropped (annual food expenditures less than $100, annual family income less than $500, or income share on food greater than 0.85). All outcome 
variables (except head working last week) correspond to annual measures taken as of the interview (in spring of the interview year).   